NORTH CAROLINA JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW
Volume 13

Number 2

Article 4

Spring 1988

Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States: The Nadir of the U.S. Trade
Relief Process
Kevin C. Kennedy

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.unc.edu/ncilj
Part of the Commercial Law Commons, and the International Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Kevin C. Kennedy, Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States: The Nadir of the U.S. Trade Relief Process, 13 N.C.
J. INT'L L. 225 (1988).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.unc.edu/ncilj/vol13/iss2/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in North Carolina Journal of International Law by an authorized editor of Carolina Law
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.

Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States: The Nadir of
the U.S. Trade Relief Process
Kevin C. Kennedy*
In contrast to the preceding article, Professor Kennedy argues that executive discretion in trade remedies often destroys the protectionfor domestic industry that the U.S. trade reliefprocess intends to give. As a backgroundfor his
discussion, Professor Kennedy uses the protracted litigationover Zenith Radio
Corporation'schallenge to a Commerce Department settlement of massive antidumping duties imposed againstJapanesetelevision importers. ProfessorKennedy concludes that the CarterAdministration's settlement of all claims for
antidumping duties,for approximately one-half ofthe duties originally imposed,
denied meaningful relief to American industries. Professor Kennedy asserts
Congress intended to limit executive discretion in antidumping law under the
Trade Agreements Act of 1979, but that the courts in Zenith Radio misconstrued congressionalintent. Professor Kennedy concludes that Congress should
expressly limit executive discretion in trade relief in legislationsuch as the Omnibus Trade Bill.

On July 2, 1987, the final chapter to one of the most bitterly
fought international trade legal battles was written. On that day the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) delivered its last
opinion in Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States,I affirming the Court of
International Trade's decision 2 refusing to assess damages in favor
of the United States on a 250,000 dollar injunction bond filed by
Zenith with the court. The Federal Circuit's opinion brought to a
close an international trade dispute spanning some sixteen years,
ending Zenith's challenge to a 1980 settlement agreement between
the Secretary of Commerce and various importers of Japanese color
televisions.
With the Zenith case history as backdrop, this article examines
how the exercise of discretionary executive branch power, motivated
largely by considerations of economic and political expediency, is allowed to subvert the U.S. international trade relief process. Zenith's
experience is not an isolated one, but has been repeated for similar
* Associate Professor of Law, Detroit College of Law; J.D. 1977, Wayne State University School of Law; LL.M. 1982, Harvard Law School. The author was a law clerk to
Senior Judge Herbert N. Maletz of the U.S. Court of International Trade from 1982-84,
and a trial attorney with the Justice Department from 1984-85 where he was responsible
for international trade litigation.
1 823 F.2d 518 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
2 Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 643 F. Supp. 1133, 1138 (Ct. Int'l Trade
1986), aff'd, 823 F.2d 518 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
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reasons in other trade relief contexts with other domestic industries.
What is most regrettable in the Zenith case, however, is that the executive branch received an unwarranted helping hand from the judiciary. As a consequence, a case which should have been heard on its
merits was nipped in the bud by courts insufficiently sensitive to the
will of Congress.
I. The Zenith Radio Corp. Background
On March 10, 1971, the Treasury Department issued a dumping
finding 3 that monochrome and color television sets from Japan were
being sold in the United States at less than fair value. 4 From the date
of this 1971 finding until 1979, most of the antidumping duties due
on these television receivers went uncollected. 5 Congress deplored
this practice of administrative neglect and so it overhauled the antidumping duty law in 1979.6 Responsibility for administering the
antidumping duty law was moved from the Treasury to the Commerce Department in 19807 and on March 28, 1980, the Commerce
Department conducted its first administrative review of the 1971
Treasury dumping finding.8 On April 28, 1980, prior to completing
3 T.D. 71-76, 5 Cust. B. & Dec. 151, 36 Fed. Reg. 4597 (1971).
4 The Treasury Department's dumping finding was issued pursuant to § 201(a) of
the Antidumping Act of 1921, ch. 14, § 201(a), 42 Stat. 11, 11, repealed by Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, § 106(a), 93 Stat. 150, 193. This finding, coupled
with a finding of injury to an American industry of competing merchandise, results in the
imposition of dumping duties equal to the margin of dumping. A finding of sales at less
than fair value is generally made when the price of merchandise in the home market is
greater than the price for such merchandise in the U.S. market. For a discussion of the
antidumping duty law, see Barshefsky & Cunningham, The Prosecution of Antidumping Actions
Under the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, 6 N.CJ. INrT'L L. & CoM. REG. 307 (1981); Horlick,
Summary of Procedures Under the United States Antidumping and CountervailingDuty Laws, 58 ST.
JOHN's L. REV. 828 (1984); Potts & Lyons, The Trade Agreements Act of 1979. Administrative
Policy and Practicein Antidumping Investigations, 6 N.C.J. INT'L L. & CoM. REG. 483 (1981).
5 See Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 509 F. Supp. 1282, 1283 (Ct. Int'l Trade
1981).
6 In the report of the Senate Committee on Finance to the Trade Agreements Act of
1979, the "dismal performance" of the Treasury Department in collecting antidumping
duties was noted. S. REP. No. 249, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 76-77 (1979) [hereinafter S. REP.
No. 249]. The upshot was transfer of responsibility for administering the antidumping
and countervailing duty laws from Treasury to the Commerce Department in 1980. See
Reorg. Plan No. 3 of 1979, § 5(a)(l)(C), 44 Fed. Reg. 69,273 (1979); Exec. Order No.
12,188, 45 Fed. Reg. 989 (1980). This transfer of authority amounted to little more than
old wine in a new bottle, however, because most of the Treasury personnel responsible for
administering the antidumping duty law transferred to the Commerce Department. Nevertheless, the generally vigorous enforcement record of the Commerce Department under
the antidumping duty law over the past seven years shows that Congress' message did not
fall on deaf ears.
7 Reorg. Plan No. 3 of 1979, § 5(a)(l)(C), 44 Fed. Reg. 69,273 (1979); Exec. Order
No. 12,188, 45 Fed. Reg. 989 (1980).
8 45 Fed. Reg. 20,511 (1980). Regular administrative reviews of outstanding countervailing and antidumping duty orders are required by section 751 of the Tariff Act of
1930, Pub. L. No. 71-361, 46 Stat. 590, added by Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L.
No. 96-39, § 101, 93 Stat. 144, 175 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 1675 (1982 &
Supp. III 1985)). In these reviews the actual margins of dumping are calculated for the

1988]

ZENITH RADIO CORP. V. UNITED STATES

that section 751 administrative review, the Secretary of Commerce
announced that he had settled all claims for antidumping duties arising from entries of the subject television sets from July 1, 1973, to
March 31, 1979. 9 The United States estimated that the potential
amount of dumping duties which could be collected was approximately 138.7 million dollars,' 0 and agreed to a settlement figure of
77 million dollars." Zenith, a domestic manufacturer of television
sets, placed the figure of potential antidumping duties due in the
hundreds of millions.12
In the face of this settlement, Zenith immediately brought an
action in the U.S. Customs Court, the predecessor court to the U.S.
Court of International Trade (CIT), challenging the lawfulness of
the settlement agreement.' 3 The company's contention was that the
implementation of the settlement agreement would result in the unlawful forgiving of hundreds of millions of dollars in antidumping
duties owed by Zenith's competitors.1 4 Zenith alleged as a first cause
of action that the settlement was ultra vires the Secretary's authority
under 19 U.S.C. section 1617,15 and, thus, illegal and void. 16 As a
second cause of action Zenith alleged that even if authority existed
under 19 U.S.C. section 1617 for the settlement, this settlement was
tainted because the government officials who recommended settlement did so in an arbitrary, capricious, and bad faith manner, having
based their decision on political and other irrelevant
period immediately preceding the review and actual duties are assessed on that basis. That
dumping margin is then used for the purpose of assessing estimated duties on imports of
affected merchandise during that prospective period until the next administrative review,
at which time actual dumping duties are again imposed with any excess estimated dumping
duties being refunded to the importer.
9 Zenith Radio Corp., 509 F. Supp. at 1284.
10 Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 673 F.2d 1254, 1256 (C.C.P.A.),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 943 (1982).
11 Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 518 F. Supp. 1347, 1348 (Ct. Int'l Trade
1981).
12 Id., (citing Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 505 F. Supp. 216, 217 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 1980)).
'3 Zenith filed its complaint on May 28, 1980, and followed it with a verified complaint on June 27, 1980. Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 505 F. Supp. 216, 217 (Ct.
Int'l Trade 1980).
14 Id.

15 That section provides:
Upon a request by a customs officer, United States attorney, or any special
attorney, having charge of any claim arising under the customs laws, showing
the facts upon which such claim is based, the probabilities of a recovery and
the terms upon which the same may be compromised, the Secretary of the
Treasury is authorized to compromise such claim, if such action shall be recommended by the General Counsel for the Department of the Treasury.
All functions of the Secretary of the Treasury and the General Counsel of the Department of the Treasury were transferred to the Secretary of Commerce and the General
Counsel of the Department of Commerce insofar as those functions relate to the settlement of claims for antidumping duties. Reorg. Plan No. 3, § 5(a)(l)(G), 44 Fed. Reg.
69,273 (1979).
16 505 F. Supp. at 217-18.
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In parallel litigation, the Committee to Preserve American Color
Television (COMPACT), a trade association representing members
of the U.S. television manufacturing industry and its workers,
brought an identical challenge.' 8 Prior to the April 28, 1980, settlement agreement, COMPACT filed an action in the District Court for
the District of Columbia challenging the delayed enforcement of the
outstanding dumping finding of March 10, 1971.19 The district
court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and an appeal was taken to
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. 20 While
that appeal was pending, the settlement agreement was executed.
On May 9, 1980, the D.C. Circuit enjoined implementation of the
agreement pending appeal. 2 1 On October 10, 1980, the Customs
Courts Act of 1980 was enacted, 22 vesting exclusive jurisdiction over
international trade matters (such as the legal challenge brought by
23
Zenith and COMPACT) in the Court of International Trade.
Against this legislative backdrop, on February 5, 1981, COMPACT
moved for a stay of proceedings in the court of appeals pending the
filing of a new complaint in the CIT and requested a determination
of the CIT's jurisdiction. 24 The allegations in COMPACT's com17 Id. at 218.
18 COMPACT v. United States, 527 F. Supp. 341, 342 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1981), aft'd,
706 F.2d 1574 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 825 (1983).
19 See id.at 343 n.4.
20 Id.
21 Id.; see also Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 505 F. Supp. 217, 218 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 1980).
22 Customs Courts Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-417, 94 Stat. 1727 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
23 The Customs Courts Act of 1980 was designed "to improve the federal judicial
machinery by clarifying and revising certain provisions of title 28, United States Code,
relating to the judiciary and judicial review of international trade matters .... H.R. REP.
No. 1235, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWs 3729
[hereinafter H.R. REP. No. 1235]. Among the revisions was the enlargement of the jurisdiction of the U.S. Customs Court, renamed the U.S. Court of International Trade. Born
out of a legislative concern that litigants were being frustrated in their attempts to obtain
judicial review, the Customs Courts Act of 1980 sought to remedy this problem by clarifying the Customs Court's subject matter jurisdiction and expanding its powers by giving it
the same powers in law and equity enjoyed by the district courts. See id. at 19-20; 28 U.S.C.
§ 1585 (1982).
Prior to 1980 the Customs Court lacked power to issue injunctive relief. Under the
law that existed prior to 1980, it had "become increasingly more difficult to determine, in
advance, whether or not a particular case [fell] within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Customs Court ....The result [was] considerable jurisdictional confusion ...." S. REP. No.
466, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1979). See generally Kennedy, A Proposal to Abolish the US.
Court of InternationalTrade, 4 DICK. J. IN'L L. 13 (1985); Cohen, The "ResidualJurisdiction"of
the Court of InternationalTrade Under the Customs CourtsAct of 1980, 26 N.Y.L. SCn. L. REv. 471
(1981); Cohen, Recent Decisions of the Court of International Trade Relating to Jurisdiction: A
Primerand Critique, 58 ST. JoHN's L. REV. 700 (1984); Rodino, The Customs Courts Act of 1980,
26 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 459 (1981); Vance, The UnrealizedJurisdictionof 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i):
A View from the Plaintiff's Bar, 58 ST. JOHN's L. REV. 793 (1984).
24 See COMPACT v. United States, 527 F. Supp. 341, 343 n.4 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1981).
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plaint were virtually identical to those made by Zenith. 2 5 In an apparent attempt to whipsaw the government, both Zenith and
COMPACT resisted efforts by the United States to consolidate the
two actions. 2 6 Consequently, the two suits did not proceed in
27
lockstep.
Faced with the potential dissolution of the injunction issued by
the D.C. Circuit in favor of COMPACT, 28 Zenith moved for a preliminary injunction in the CIT in late 1980.29 Applying the traditional
four-part test3 0 for determining the propriety of injunctive relief
pendente lite,3 1 the CIT concluded with virtually no factual discussion or legal analysis that Zenith was likely to prevail on the merits of
its complaint.3 2 Similarly, with respect to irreparable injury the
court concluded that Zenith would not only lose its right to judicial
review if the settlement agreement was implemented,3 3 but that its
competitors would be tremendously rewarded by the allegedly illegal
forgiveness of hundreds of millions of dollars in dumping duties, all
to Zenith's detriment.3 4 As for the balance of hardships factor, the
CIT properly rejected the government's bootstrap argument that the
Department of Justice had relied to its detriment on the settlement
The government conceded that the Court of International Trade had jurisdiction over
Zenith's and COMPACT's actions. See Zenith Radio Corp., 505 F. Supp. at 219 n.2.
25 See COMPACT, 527 F. Supp. at 342; COMPACT v. United States, 706 F.2d 1574,
1576 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 825 (1983).
26 COMPACT, 706 F.2d at 1576.
27 Id.
28 As the Court of International Trade observed in Zenith Radio Corp. v. United
States, 505 F. Supp. 216 (1980):
[T]he enactment of the Customs Courts Act of 1980 makes imminent the
dissolution by the D.C. Circuit of its injunction in view of the exclusivity of
subject matter jurisdiction which Congress has now vested in this court .
*.
In this posture the injunction pending appeal could be dissolved by the D.C.
Circuit at any time.
505 F. Supp. at 218.
29 Id.at 216.
30 In order to prevail the petitioner must show:
(1) that there is a substantial likelihood that the petitioner will prevail on the
merits; (2) that without the relief requested the petitioner will be irreparably
injured; (3) that the issuance of the relief requested will not substantially
harm other interested parties; and (4) that the public interest would be
served by the relief requested.
Id.at 218 (footnote omitted).
31 Id. at 218-20.
32 Id.at 219.
33 Id. The loss of the right to judicial review seems to be a matter more properly
addressed in an All Writs Act injunction under 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) than in a Rule 65
injunction.
34 505 F. Supp. at 219. The court rejected the government's argument that Zenith's
current competitive position vii-a-vig its Japanese counterparts could not be adversely affected because the settlement agreement only covered past entries of television sets. Id.
The CIT's response was that Congress believed that domestic manufacturers such as
Zenith could be harmed by nonenforcement of the antidumping duty laws. Id. Nevertheless, to equate Congress' view with the immediate and irreparable harm contemplated
under rule 65 seems to be a somewhat sophistic twist on the concept of irreparable injury.
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agreement by voluntarily dismissing with prejudice two pending collection actions. 3 5 Regarding the public interest factor, the court concluded that the public interest "lies in the faithful execution by the
Executive Branch of the laws enacted by Congress ....

[P]laintiff has

raised serious issues concerning the Executive Branch's exercise of
its responsibilities under the antidumping law ....

"36

Accordingly,

the CIT preliminarily enjoined implementation of the settlement
7
agreement on December 9, 1980.3

Flush with victory, and apparently buoyed by the CIT's conclusion that Zenith had made out a substantial case, at least on its second cause of action, 38 Zenith moved for partial summary judgment
on its first cause of action that the settlement agreement was ultra
vires the Secretary's authority under 19 U.S.C. section 1617.39 The
government cross-moved for summary judgment. 40 In an opinion
issued on February 27, 1981,41 the CIT concluded that the plain language of section 617, which enables the Secretary to compromise
"any claim arising under the customs laws," meant that the United
States possessed a claim against the importers of Japanese television
sets which could be compromised "even though the exact amount of
42
the claim had not been fixed through the process of liquidation."
As for Zenith's contention that enactment of section 751 of the Tariff
4
Act of 1930, as added by the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, 3
amounted to an implied repeal of the Secretary's authority to settle
antidumping duty cases, 44 the court found no implied repeal of section 617 in section 751 and, more importantly, was able to give effect
45
to both statutes.
The CIT found sections 751 and 617 to be two distinct statutes
with two different purposes, the former dealing with the assessment
of antidumping duty claims that are not settled, and the latter deal35 Id. at 220.
36 Id.
37 Id. at 216, 220-21.

38 Id. at 219. The court specifically noted that its decision to issue the preliminary
injunction was made "without reference to plaintiff's first cause of action ....
Id.
39 Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 509 F. Supp. 1282, 1283 (Ct. Int'l Trade
1981).
40 Id.

41 Id. at 1282.
42 Id. at 1286 (footnote omitted). "Liquidation" is the final duty assessment phase in
the entry process. Most of the entries which were the subject of Zenith's suit were unliquidated. Id. at 1284 n.7.
43 19 U.S.C. § 1675 (1982 & Supp. III). That section requires the Commerce Department to periodically review all outstanding antidumping and countervailing duty orders
and to assess actual dumping and countervailing duties on all unliquidated entries of merchandise subject to such orders.
44 509 F. Supp. at 1286. Zenith argued in effect that Congress' purpose in enacting
§ 751 was the speedy and efficient collection of antidumping duties, the implication being
that the settlement of antidumping duty claims is prohibited. See id. at 1286.
45 Id. at 1286-87.
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ing with such claims that are settled. 4 6 Moreover, the CIT added
that to the extent settlement expedites the duty collection process,
section 617 was fully consonant with the congressional intent behind
enactment of section 751.47 The CIT accordingly denied Zenith's

motion for partial summary judgment, granted the government's
motion as to Zenith's first cause of action, and denied the government's motion with respect to Zenith's second cause of action based
on a genuine issue of material fact raised by Zenith at the hearing on
48
its motion for a preliminary injunction.
Realizing that it was faced with potentially protracted and vexing
discovery on Zenith's remaining cause of action, the government decided to apply pressure of its own by filing a motion on June 9, 1981,
to require Zenith to post security pursuant to rule 65(c) of the CIT. 49
The government's motion was made seven months after the CIT
granted Zenith's request for a preliminary injunction. Interestingly,
the government never requested the posting of security in the litigation between it and COMPACT, even though an injunction was also
50
issued there.
The government requested security in the amount of 11.5 million dollars, an amount equivalent to fifteen percent interest for one
year. 5 ' Zenith resisted the posting of any security, arguing that the
injunction was issued ptirsuant to the All Writs Act rather than CIT
rule 65.52 The court agreed that its earlier injunction was in effect an
All Writs Act injunction, thereby dispensing with the security requirement. 53 Although the CIT concluded that no security was required, the court oddly enough went on to observe that under rule
65(c) it nevertheless had the discretion to require security in a nominal amount, adding that a prohibitively high security requirement
might preclude Zenith's right to judicial review. 54 Costing Zenith
out of the litigation was, of course, one of the government's reasons
for insisting on such a large amount of security from Zenith,
although the amount it requested was reasonable under the circumstances. In the end, the CIT required Zenith to post security of
250,000 dollars pursuant to rule 65(c)-from which the government
46 Id. at 1287.
47 Id. at 1287-88.

48
Trade
49
1981).

Id. at 1288; see Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 505 F. Supp. 216, 219 (Ct. Int'l
1980).
Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 518 F. Supp. 1347, 1348 (Ct. Int'l Trade
CIT rule 65(c) is identical to FEn. R. Civ. P. 65(c).

50 Id. at 1348 n.2.
51 Id. at 1348.

52 Id. Security is not required for injunctions issued pursuant to the All Writs Act.
See id. at 1349, and cases cited therein.
53 Id.
54 Id.at 1350.
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could be made whole if it was eventually determined that the United
States had been wrongfully enjoined.
By requiring what under the circumstances was only nominal security, the CIT was beginning to reveal with whom its sympathies lay.
Why the court shifted in midstream from its conclusion that no security was required to a requirement that only nominal security
would be imposed on Zenith is difficult to fathom, unless the CIT
was attempting to forestall any serious thought on the part of the
government to appeal the court's security decision. Recalling the
CIT's observation that the government took seven months before it
even sought security from Zenith, coupled with the fact that the
United States never asked for security in the COMPACT litigation
pending in the D.C. Circuit, 55 it may well have been that the CIT
doubted the government's good faith in seeking security. In an equity context that factor arguably could be important, but whether or
not that would be a legitimate consideration in requiring Zenith to
post only nominal security is debatable, given rule 65(c)'s express
language that security shall be required in all cases where a preliminary injunction is issued. That considerations such as the government's lack of good faith figured in the court's decision to set the
amount of security so low seems less debatable.
In a reprise of the Zenith motions for summary judgment and for
preliminary injunction, COMPACT filed identical motions with the
CIT in late 1981 and 1982.56 COMPACT's motion for partial summary judgment made essentially the same arguments advanced by
Zenith in its motion for partial judgment. 5 7 The CIT, once again
resorting to the plain language of section 617, found that section 617
authorizes the government to compromise "any claim arising under
customs laws," including the present claim for dumping duties.

58

Rejecting COMPACT's contention that the only claims contemplated as an appropriate subject for settlement were claims for fines,
55 Id. at 1348 n.2.
56 COMPACT v. United States, 551 F. Supp. 1142 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1982), aft'd, 706
F.2d 1574 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 825 (1983); COMPACT v. United States, 527 F.
Supp. 341 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1981), aff'd, 706 F.2d 1574 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 825
(1983).
57 Taking a slightly different tack, COMPACT argued that § 617 only authorized the
compromise of claims for duties which were penal in nature, such as fines, penalties, and
forfeitures. 527 F. Supp. at 344. Because antidumping duties are not penal in nature,
COMPACT contended, they could not be settled under authority of § 617. Id. Zenith had

argued in its motion for partial summary judgment that only liquidated claims for duties
could be settled under § 617, and that because the claim for antidumping duties at issue
here was in the main unliquidated, no authority existed for the settlement agreement
under § 617. Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 509 F. Supp. 1282, 1284 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 1981). COMPACT did make the same argument as Zenith, however, that the compromise of a claim for antidumping duties under § 617 was repugnant to its right to administrative review under § 751. See 527 F. Supp. at 349-50. This argument was also
rejected by the CIT. 527 F. Supp. at 350.
58 COMPACT v. United States, 527 F. Supp. at 343.
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penalties, and forfeitures (that is, claims penal in nature), the court
concluded that when Congress intended to so limit the Secretary's
authority, it did so expressly, noting that such limiting language was
included in section 616 of the Tariff Act of 1930. 59 Accordingly, the
court denied COMPACT's motion and granted the government's
60
cross-motion for summary judgment on that cause of action.
The CIT's denial of COMPACT's motion certainly came as no
surprise in view of the court's earlier denial of Zenith's motion on
similar grounds. Nevertheless, a dark cloud was looming on the horizon for Zenith and COMPACT which neither they nor even the
government had forecast. Four months after the CIT's decision in
COMPACT, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA) was to
deal a mortal blow to these plaintiffs' actions.
Undaunted by its lack of success on the merits of its first cause of
action, Zenith cranked up the engines of discovery in an attempt to
prove its claim of alleged arbitrary, capricious, and bad faith conduct
by the government in settling these claims. In the course of an appeal from a CIT discovery order to the CCPA (a predecessor court to
the Federal Circuit), the CCPA raised the issue of subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte. 61 After examining Zenith's complaint, the
CCPA concluded that Zenith was attempting to press inquiry into the
merits of and motives for the settlement, a prohibited area of inquiry
in the court's view. 62 At most, the court explained, Zenith could
challenge procedural irregularities in reaching the settlement; how63
ever other avenues of inquiry were beyond a court's jurisdiction.
According to the court:
In no previous case has a court assumed jurisdiction at the behest of

a third party to review the merits of a settlement agreement entered

into by the Government with its [the third party's] competitor. The

only precedent we find for setting aside a settlement is where the
court has found that the complainant was deprived of its statutory
right to a hearing on the merits of the underlying case prior to settlement .... [D]iscretionary action cannot be reviewed if "there is no
law to apply." . . . No situation is more within the category of "no

law to apply" than the multifaceted judgmental decision to settle a
claim. Thus, the substance
of the settlement is clearly outside the
64
scope of judicial review.

Invoking the "no law to apply" rule of judicial review, 65 the
CCPA added that in matters entrusted to executive branch discre59 527 F. Supp. at 344-45.
60 Id. at 350.
61 Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 673 F.2d 1254, 1258 n.7
(C.C.P.A.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 943 (1982).
62 Id. at 1264.
63 l at 1265.
64 Id. at 1262 (citations omitted).
65 Id. at 1262 (citing Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402,

410 (1971)).
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tion, "[t]he only law to apply here is set forth as procedural requirements in 19 U.S.C. § 1617, and any legal wrong to Zenith must be
based on the Secretary's violation of the procedures set forth
therein."'6 6 The substance, merits, and motives for entering into the
67
settlement agreement were outside the scope of judicial review.
Because Zenith never challenged the procedural regularity of the
Secretary's action in reaching the settlement agreement, the CCPA
reversed and remanded the case with directions to dismiss for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction. 68
The serious difficulty with the CCPA's decision is that no acknowledgment was made of Zenith's right to an administrative review of the outstanding dumping finding under section 751 and to
judicial review of the agency's action thereunder pursuant to 19
U.S.C. section 1516a. Such review would have gone to the merits.
By reading section 617 settlements as outside the scope of section
751 administrative determinations, 6 9 the CCPA unraveled a potentially knotty problem for the government but at the same time ignored congressional intent. In view of Congress' desire to afford
American industry a greater role in the administrative process by
which antidumping duties are assessed, 7? as well as its goal of introducing more procedural safeguards into this process, 7 1 one wonders
whether the CCPA's delivery of section 617 from the jaws of section
751 was premised more on semantics and sophistry than sound legal
reasoning. In this connection, the CCPA would have done well to
heed the advice of Judge Learned Hand that
it is one of the surest indexes of a mature and developed jurisprudence not to make a fortress out of the dictionary; but to remember
that statutes always have some purpose or object to accomplish,
whose sympathetic and imaginative discovery is the surest guide to
72
their meaning.

Following this stunning defeat, Zenith filed a petition for a writ
of certiorari. While Zenith's petition was pending, the CIT denied
the government's motion to dissolve the preliminary injunction on
the ground that implementation of the settlement agreement would
73
moot the controversy and thereby prevent Supreme Court review.
66 Id.
67 Id.
68 Id.

at 1262-63.
at 1265.
69 The CCPA explained that 19 U.S.C. § 1516a provides for judicial review of certain
agency "determinations," including those made under § 751, but that § 617 settlements
do not result in "determinations" within the contemplation of 19 U.S.C. § 1516a. Consequently, no judicial review of the factual or legal bases of § 617 settlements was permissible. Id.at 1260.
70 S.REP. No. 249, supra note 6, at 81 ("[section 751] provides a greater role for
domestic interested parties and introduces more procedural safeguards").
71 Id.
72 Cabell
73 Zenith

v. Markham, 148 F.2d 737, 739 (2d Cir.), aff'd, 326 U.S. 404, 409 (1945).
Radio Corp. v. United States, 3 Ct. Int'l Trade 243, 244 (1982).
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After the Supreme Court denied certiorari on October 18, 1982, 74
75
the CIT dissolved the preliminary injunction.
The baton was now passed to COMPACT which returned to the
CIT immediately before dissolution of the Zenith injunction to salvage its and Zenith's seemingly doomed cases with motions for leave
to amend its complaint and for a preliminary injunction. 76 Concluding that COMPACT could not succeed on the merits of its amended
complaint, the CIT denied COMPACT's motion for a preliminary
injunction. 7 7 In COMPACT's five-count amended complaint, the
first and fifth counts tracked the first and second causes of action in
COMPACT'S original complaint, that is, ultra vires and bad faith
conduct by the Secretary of Commerce. 78 Taking its cue from the
CCPA's Montgomery Ward decision, COMPACT's second, third, and
fourth counts alleged procedural
irregularities by the government in
79
reaching the settlement.
Specifically, in Count II of its amended complaint COMPACT
contended that the requirement of section 617 that a report and recommendation be submitted to the Secretary of Commerce had not
been satisfied.8 0 The CIT had little difficulty, however, in finding
that the reports, letters, and memoranda submitted by the Commissioner of Customs, the General Counsel of the Department of Commerce, and other government officials satisfied section 617's
documentation requirements. To COMPACT's argument that a single report is required under section 617, the court reminded the
plaintiff that the reporting requirement was designed to ensure that
the Secretary made an informed settlement decision. 8 ' "Given this
consideration," the CIT concluded, "the various letters and memoranda prepared in contemplation of a section 617 settlement, either
severally or collectively, satisfy the procedural requirements of section 617."82
In Count III of its amended complaint, COMPACT challenged
the factual accuracy of the General Counsel's settlement recommendation. Declining COMPACT's invitation to scrutinize the recommendation, the court noted that such an inquiry would go to the
74 Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 459 U.S. 943 (1982).
75 Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 4 Ct. Int'l Trade 201, 202 (1982). The injunction was dissolved on November 15, 1982.
76 COMPACT v. United States, 551 F. Supp. 1142 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1982), aft'd, 706
F.2d 1574 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 825 (1983).
77 Id. at 1144.
78 Id The allegation of ultra vires conduct by the Secretary had earlier been dismissed by the CIT, see COMPACT v. United States, 527 F. Supp. 341, 350 (Ct. Int'l Trade
1981), aff'd, 706 F.2d 1574 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 825 (1983), and was also rejected by the CCPA in Montgomery Ward.
79 551 F. Supp. at 1145.

80 Id.
81 Id at
82 Id

1147.
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merits and substance of the General Counsel's recommendation, 83a
prohibited area of inquiry under the Montgomery Ward decision.
With regard to Count IV's allegations of procedural irregularity insofar as whether the Secretary actually considered the report or recommendation, the CIT once again fell back on Montgomery Ward's
84
admonition not to probe the mental processes of the Secretary.
Given that all of the reports and the recommendation antedated the
Secretary's decision to settle, the strong presumption of administrative regularity applied. 85 Turning finally to Count V of the amended
complaint, the court concluded that allegations of bad faith conduct
were in essence an attack on the motives for settlement, an area of
inquiry beyond the CIT's jurisdiction. 86 Having thus concluded that
there was little, if any, likelihood of success on the merits of COMPACT's amended complaint, the CIT denied its motion for a preliminary injunction.8 7 The CIT consolidated the hearing on the motion
with trial on the merits and granted judgment in favor of the government on all counts. 8 8 The lessons of Montgomery Ward were clearly
not lost on the CIT. Arguably, the CIT applied those lessons with a
vengeance.
With so much at stake, COMPACT took an appeal to the Federal
Circuit.89 Even without the benefit of hindsight, this appeal must

surely have seemed a futile gesture to COMPACT. Putting to rest
any lingering doubts as to whether it had decided otherwise in Montgomery Ward, the Federal Circuit reiterated that section 617 includes
the power to settle antidumping duty claims. 90 As for Counts II
through IV, the Federal Circuit reassured the CIT that the latter's
reading of the Montgomery Ward decision was on the mark. 9 ' Parroting the rationale of the CIT for rejecting those three counts, the Federal Circuit affirmed the decision. 9 2 Finally, regarding Count V's bad
faith allegations, the CAFC repeated its earlier statement in Montgomery Ward that "[p]roving that the estimate in the report ...was lower
than what Zenith considers reasonable does not destroy the lawfulness of [the Secretary's] decision."19 3 With that conclusion, the Federal Circuit affirmed the CIT and dissolved the injunction pending
83
84
85
86
87
88

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

Id. at 1142.
89 COMPACT v. United States, 706 F.2d 1574 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 825

(1983).
90 Id. at 1577.
9 Id.
92 Id.at 1577-78.
93 Id.at 1579 (quoting Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 673 F.2d
1254, 1264 (C.C.P.A.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 943 (1982)).
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appeal. 94 Apparently none the wiser from Zenith's experience with
the Supreme Court, COMPACT likewise petitioned for a writ of cer95
tiorari and met the same fate as Zenith on October 3, 1983.

The enmity with which these cases were litigated manifested itself in the post-judgment proceedings brought by the United States
to recover against the 250,000 dollar bond deposited by Zenith in
connection with the grant of its motion for a preliminary injunction.
Whether the government's decision to move against the bond was an
economically rational one is questionable in view of the protracted
nature of the post-judgment proceedings compared to the modest
amount of the bond. 9 6 In any event, after dissolution of the Zenith
injunction, the government moved for assessment of damages on the
injunction bond. The government sought to recover the lost interest
on the delayed implementation of the settlement agreement. 97 Not
surprisingly, Zenith opposed the motion on grounds that interest
had accrued in favor of the government under the settlement agreement, and thus no damages were incurred. 98 Furthermore, Zenith
contended that even if there were damages, the government had
failed to enforce its rights to collect interest, and that failure
amounted to a failure to mitigate damages. 99
After learning of an intragovernmental dispute between the
Commerce Department and the Customs Service over whether the
government should have sought interest from the importers, Zenith
served the United States with interrogatories and requests for production of documents relating to the substance of all communications concerning whether interest would or should accrue under the
settlement agreement.' 0 0 Although the United States responded in
part to Zenith's discovery request, it asserted privilege with respect
to discovery of information concerning three meetings held in July
1983 among the Commerce Department, Justice Department, and
Customs Service, at which a decision was reached not to seek interest
from the importers.' 0 ' Zenith then made a motion to compel discovery on the grounds that the United States had waived its privileges by
94 Id. at 1579.
95 COMPACT v. United States, 464 U.S. 825 (1983).
96 It may be the case that the government's decision to proceed against the injunction
bond was premised on considerations which transcended the instant litigation, such as the
deterrent effect the government's action would have on future litigants contemplating
seeking injunctive relief against the United States. Unfortunately, if that was the government's thinking, the relatively insignificant amount of the injunction bond required of
Zenith arguably made this case the wrong one for sending a signal to persons entertaining
the thought of suing the United States for injunctive relief.

97 See Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 764 F.2d 1577, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
98 Id.
99 Id.
100 Id. at 1578-79.
10i Id. at 1579.
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seeking damages.' 0 2 After an in camera inspection of the sought-after
documents, the CIT agreed that the government had waived its privileges with the exception of one document and one sentence in another document. '

03

In reversing the CIT, the Federal Circuit concluded that Zenith
had not made a sufficient showing of need for the documents in
question or that the opinions sought would be particularly probative
for purposes of Zenith's defense. 10 4 More importantly, however, the
question of whether the government was entitled to interest under
the settlement agreement turned upon an interpretation of that
agreement which, as the CAFC noted, was an issue of law. 10 5 Thus,
although the CAFC agreed with the CIT as far as the applicable legal
standard was concerned, it disagreed with the CIT's application of
10 6
that standard to the given facts.
More than a year after the Federal Circuit's reversal of the CIT's
discovery order and more than three years after the government filed
its motion to assess damages, the CIT issued its decision on that motion. As an initial matter, the court discussed the two general approaches federal courts have taken in assessing damages against an
injunction bond. 10 7 The Page Communication approach adopted by
the D.C. Circuit states that even where rule 65(c) requires a bond, it
does not mean that the court is required to award damages on the
bond if the injunction is dissolved. The court must still avoid inequitable results.' 0 8 The Coyne-Delany approach adopted by the 7th Circuit states that when a defendant sustains damages because of a
wrongfully issued preliminary injunction, the plaintiff should "normally be required to pay the damages, at least up to the limit of the
bond."' 1 9 Both of these approaches recognize the equitable discretion which the trial court retains in making any such assessment." 0
Against that legal backdrop, the CIT denied the government's motion on the ground that the CCPA's Montgomery Ward decision decided a novel jurisdictional question "contrary to what Zenith
legitimately could have expected.""' In the court's view, that decision effectively constituted a change in the law, a reason previously
102 Id.
103 Id. at 1579. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 588 F. Supp. 1443, 1444-46

(Ct. Int'l Trade), rev'd, 764 F.2d 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
104 764 F.2d at 1580-81.
105 Id. at 1579-80.
106 Id.
107 Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 643 F. Supp. 1133, 1135-36 (Ct. Int'l Trade

1986), aft'd, 823 F.2d 518 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
108 Id.
109 Id.
I10 Id. at 1136-37. For a discussion of damage awards against injunction bonds, see
Note, Recovery for Wrongful Interlocutory Injunctions Under Rule 65(c), 99 HARV. L. REv. 828
(1986).
'11 643 F. Supp. at 1138.
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cited by other courts for refusing to assess damages on an injunction
bond."12
Seven years after it all began, the Federal Circuit penned the last
chapter in what had truly become a "lengthy saga."' 1 3 On the government's appeal from the CIT's denial of its motion for assessment
of damages, the CAFC applied an abuse-of-discretion standard of review and affirmed." 4 Taking issue with the CIT's characterization of
' 15
the CAFC's Montgomery Ward decision as a "change in the law,"
adding that had it made the initial decision whether to assess damages on the bond it might have weighed factors differently than the
CIT, the Federal Circuit nevertheless concluded that on balance the
CIT had not abused its discretion in reaching the conclusion that it
6
1
did. '

Zenith had won a small, but bittersweet, battle. Zenith, together
with COMPACT, should have won the war. As discussed in the next
part of this article, the CIT and the CAFC both misinterpreted the
antidumping duty law when dismissing Zenith's and COMPACT's
first causes of action. At this stage, unfortunately, if they want to
press their fight further, Zenith and COMPACT will have to do so in
the halls of Congress, for it is only from there that their nemesis in
this legal challenge, discretionary executive branch power in the field
of international trade, can be effectively curbed. The need for flexibility and discretion in resolving delicate international trade issues is
understandable. When the exercise of discretion fails to comport
with justice, propriety, and the law, however, and instead shows
favor and unrestraint, such discretion becomes license and is
unexcusable.
112 See id. at 1138, and cases cited therein. The CIT explained:
Because of the jurisdictional ruling in Montgomery Ward, Zenith will never
have an opportunity to prove its allegation, which the court has found nonfrivolous, that the $77 million settlement was tainted by bad faith. Under all
the circumstances, however, it would be manifestly unfair to add a rule 65(c)
insult to the jurisdictional injury. The $77 million settlement has never been
vindicated on the merits. Rather, this court was held to lack jurisdiction to
review the merits of the settlement. If Zenith lost the opportunity to be
heard on its good faith claim of governmental impropriety, it should not be
required to pay damages to the government as well.
Id. at 1138.
113 Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 823 F.2d 518 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
'14 Id. at 522.
115 The Federal Circuit commented as follows:
The Montgomery Ward decision was not a "change in the law" in the sense that
term has been used in other cases that upheld a district court's denial of
damages resulting from a preliminary injunction.... On the other hand, the
decision did announce and apply a limitation upon the jurisdiction of the
Court of International Trade that had not theretofor been stated. The result
was to preclude Zenith from litigating its contention, which the Court of International Trade "found nonfrivolous, that the $77 million settlement was
tainted by bad faith."
Id. at 522 (citations omitted).
116 id. at 522.
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II. The Zenith Settlement: Discretionary Power As License
In the field of foreign affairs the President has enjoyed wide latitude in dealing with international emergencies and in formulating
U.S. foreign policy. 1 17 In United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Co., 118 a
unanimous Supreme Court declared that the President possesses
"plenary and exclusive power . . .in the field of international relations."' 119 While the President may be vested with an inherent foreign affairs power, 120 no such power exists in the field of

international trade. The Constitution expressly vests in Congress,
not the executive branch, exclusive power to regulate foreign trade
pursuant to the Commerce Clause. 121
When it enacts legislation regulating international trade, Congress does, of course, delegate to the executive branch discretionary
powers in order to implement its legislative scheme. 122 Yet even in
117 See L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 37 (1972); Dames &

Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 656 (1981).
I's 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
119 Id. at 320.
120 But see Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635-36 n.2 (1952)
Uackson, J., concurring). For a criticism of Justice Sutherland's theory of Presidential
power outlined in the Curtiss-Wright decision, see Berger, The PresidentialMonopoly of Foreign
Relations, 71 MICH. L. REV. 1, 26-28 (1972); Levitan, The Foreign Relations Power: An Analysis
of Mr. Justice Sutherland's Theory, 55 YALE LJ. 467 (1946).
121 U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cis. I & 3. See United States v. Guy W. Capps, Inc., 204 F.2d
655 (4th Cir. 1953), aff'd on other grounds, 348 U.S. 296 (1955), where the Fourth Circuit
noted:
[W]hile the President has certain inherent powers under the Constitution...
the power to regulate interstate and foreign commerce is not among the
powers incident to the Presidential office, but is expressly vested by the Constitution in the Congress.
204 F.2d at 659. Notwithstanding this textual commitment of the foreign commerce
power to Congress, "[ilt
is impossible to extricate the question of distribution of powers
over foreign economic affairs from the general problem of distribution of powers over
foreign affairs in United States governmental and constitutional practice." J. JACKSON &
W. DAVEY, CASES ON LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 77 (1986).
Nevertheless, "even though the conduct of general foreign policy .. .may rest largely in
the Executive Branch, when it comes to economic foreign policy, Congress does not hesitate to assert itself." Id. at 105.
122 See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 1854 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (originally enacted as Agricultural Act of 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-540, § 204, 70 Stat. 188, 200); 19 U.S.C. § 13 3 7(g)
(1982) (originally enacted as Tariff Act of 1930, Pub. L. No. 71-361, § 337(g), 46 Stat. 590,
704); id. § 1861 (1982) (originally enacted as Trade Expansion Act of 1962, Pub. L. No.
87-794, 76 Stat. 872); id. §§ 2251-2252 (1982 & Supp. III 1985) (originally enacted as
Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 201, 88 Stat. 1978, 2011-24); id. § 2411 (Supp.
III 1985) (originally enacted as Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 301, 88 Stat.
1978, 2041-43); id. §§ 2461-2466 (1982 & Supp. 1II 1985) (originally enacted as Trade
and Tariff Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-573, §§ 502-508, 98 Stat. 2948, 3018-23); 50 U.S.C.
§§ 1701-1706 (1982 & Supp. III 1985) (originally enacted as International Emergency
Economic Powers Act, Pub. L. No. 95-223, 91 Stat. 1626 (1984)). For recent decisions
interpreting the President's power under most of these trade statutes, see Florsheim Shoe
Co. v. United States, 744 F.2d 787 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (Generalized System of Preferences);
Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981) (International Emergency Economic Powers Act); Amer. Ass'n of Exporters & Importers v. United States, 751 F.2d 1239 (Fed. Cir.
1985) (section 204 of the Agricultural Act of 1956); Atlantic Richfield Co. v. United States,
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those instances where Congress has given the executive branch
broad discretionary powers, Congress has sometimes warned against
the exercise of that power for reasons other than the merits. For example, in a revealing remark the Senate Finance Committee's report
on section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974 noted that "relief ought not
to be denied for reasons that have nothing to do with the merits of
the case as determined under U.S. law.... [N]o U.S. industry which

has suffered serious injury should be cut off from relief for foreign
policy reasons."' 2 3 These remarks evidence a congressional desire,
if not directive, that the administrative decision-making process be
depoliticized. But if that is so, then how is it possible to explain the
President's decision to grant some form of relief in only eleven of
thirty-two affirmative section 201 cases from 1974 to 121986?124
At
5
least a partial answer must be pressure group politics.

By contrast with section 201 escape clause relief, when Congress
amended section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 in 1974, it delegated
authority to the President to disapprove affirmative section 337 determinations "for policy reasons." 12 6 The Senate Finance Committee Report on the Trade Act of 1974 explained why Congress felt it
necessary to give the President discretionary disapproval authority:
The President would often be able to best see the impact which the
relief ordered by the [International Trade] Commission may have
upon the public health and welfare, competitive conditions in the
United States economy, the production of like or directly competi12 7
tive articles in the United States, and United States consumers.

Yet explanations such as these still are cold comfort to domestic
industries which find themselves cut off from trade relief, even after
they have successfully established their entitlement to relief, by the
exercise of discretionary power by the executive branch which shortcircuits the administrative process. While the flexibility that comes
588 F. Supp. 427 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1984) (section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962);
Duracell Inc. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 778 F.2d 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (section 337 of
the Tariff Act of 1930); Maple Leaf Fish Co. v. United States, 762 F.2d 86 (Fed. Cir. 1985)
(section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974). For a discussion of the discretionary executive
branch power under three of these trade statutes, see Kennedy, PresidentialAuthority Under
Section 337, Section 301, and the Escape Clause: The Case for Less Discretion, 20 CORNELL INT'L
L.J. 127 (1987).
123 S. REP. No. 1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 205 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 7268 [hereinafter S. REP. No. 1298].
124 See Applebaum, Section 201 (The Escape Clause), and Section 406 of the Trade Act of
1974, in UNITED STATES IMPORT RELIEF LAWS, CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN LAW AND POLICY
137, 158 (Practicing Law Institute 1985).
125 See Kennedy, supra note 122, at 147, 150, where the author concludes that "[n]o
clear pattern emerges from these affirmative presidential relief determinations ....
[A]
possible explanation . . . is the size of the industry in question, both domestically and
worldwide. The President is more likely to withhold relief when a larger industry is
involved."
126 19 U.S.C. § 13 3 7 (g)( 2 ) (1982).
127 S. REP. No. 1298, supra note 123, at 199, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 7211, 7331-32.
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with discretionary power is undoubtedly welcomed and closely embraced by the executive branch, the unpredictability that necessarily
follows from the exercise of that power gives rise to a perception on
the part of U.S. domestic industries that U.S. trade laws are arbitrarily and capriciously administered. Witness the Zenith debacle. An
observer cannot help but be struck by the thought that it was interest
group politics, not the merits of a trade relief case, that informed the
Zenith decision-making process. The disturbing upshot of episodes
such as Zenith and COMPACT, of course, is that American manufacturers and producers may reject outright the statutory mechanisms
created by Congress for securing trade relief in preference to extralegal (and arguably unconstitutional) trade relief devices such as vol128
untary restraint agreements.
Congress has responded in a small way by introducing legislation that eliminates or substantially curtails executive branch discretion to deny trade relief under sections 201 and 301 of the Trade Act
of 1974.129 (An executive branch decision to deny trade relief is, of

course, tantamount to settling a trade relief case in favor of the foreign industry.) Amending the various trade relief laws by eliminating or circumscribing the discretionary power of the executive
branch to either grant or withhold trade relief or to settle trade cases
would be a major step in the direction of restoring regularity and
predictability to an administrative process riven with unpredictability
and incoherence. The elimination of most executive branch discretion under U.S. trade laws would put an end to the license that has
crept into these trade relief proceedings to the detriment of U.S. domestic industry. The elimination of most executive branch discretionary power would also be in the best interests of representative
democracy for the simple reason that public confidence in the regularity and rationality of government would be enhanced. Conversely, when meritorious trade relief petitions are thwarted by the
exercise of executive branch discretion after an affirmative agency
determination that was the product of a regularized administrative
proceeding, U.S. industries can only shake their collective head in
frustration and disbelief.
The debate over eliminating executive branch discretionary
power under U.S. trade relief laws has been discussed elsewhere and
will not be repeated here.' 3 0 More importantly, as the next part of
the article explores, no such law reform would have been necessary
in order for Zenith and COMPACT to have prevailed in their law128 See, e.g., More Voluntary RestraintAgreements Said Solution to U.S, Trade Imbalance, 4 Int'l

Trade Rep. (BNA) at 490 (Apr. 8, 1987); Industry Leaders Urge Administration to Take Tougher
Imports Stance, Callfor More VRAs, 3 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) at 461 (Apr. 9, 1986).
129 See, e.g., Senate Omnibus Trade Act of 1987, S. 490, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987);
H.R. 4800, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. § 201, 132 CONG. REC. 3173 (1986).
130 See, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 122.
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suits. The law as it existed then, even though it gave and still gives
the executive branch discretionary power to settle antidumping duty
cases, nevertheless curtailed the exercise of that power sufficiently so
that those litigants should have had a hearing on the merits of their
complaint.
III. Discretionary Power to Settle Antidumping Duty Cases
Under most of the U.S. trade relief laws, Congress has given the
13 1
President broad discretionary powers to grant or withhold relief.
In notable contrast, however, in 1979 Congress trimmed the breadth
of that discretionary power considerably under the antidumping
(AD) and countervailing duty (CVD) laws,' 3 2 far and away the most
widely used and most discretion-free of all the U.S. trade relief statutes. 133 Indeed, the statutory provision affording interested parties
judicial review of AD and CVD determinations 34 represents a clear
congressional expression that regularity and rationality should be
13 5
the hallmarks of an AD or CVD administrative proceeding.
Despite the absence generally of broad discretionary executive
branch power under the AD and CVD laws, such cases may still be
36
settled at the administrative level by the Commerce Department,
bypassing the regularized administrative process. Nevertheless, specific statutory criteria must be satisfied before an AD or CVD investigation may be suspended. 13 7 In the legislative history of the Trade
Agreements Act of 1979, Congress made it abundantly clear that
shortcircuiting the AD and CVD administrative process was to be the
rare exception:
The suspension provision is intended to permit rapid and pragmatic
resolutions of countervailing duty cases. However, suspension is an
unusual action which should not become the normal means of disposing of cases. The Committee intends that investigations be suspended only when that action serves the interests of the public and
the domestic industry affected. For this reason,
the authority to' suspend
13 8
investigations is narrowly circumscribed.
131 See id., where the President's discretionary powers under § 337 of the Tariff Act of
1930, and § 201 and 301
of the Trade Act of 1974 are analyzed.
132 19 U.S.C. §§ 167 1-1677g (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
133 From 1980 through 1986, over 500 antidumping (AD) and countervailing duty
(CVD) petitions were filed with the Commerce Department. See Illegal and Unfair Foreign
Trade Practices in Interstateand Foreign Commerce: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and
Investigations of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1986)

(testimony of Malcolm Baldrige, Secretary of Commerce).
134 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(a) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
135 The right to judicial review under the AD and CVD laws is to be contrasted with
§§ 201 and 301 trade relief where there is no right to judicial review. See Maple Leaf Fish
Co. v. United States, 762 F.2d 86 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
136 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671(c), 1673(c) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
137 Id. §§ 1671c(b), 1671c(d), 1673c(b), 1673c(d) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
138 S. REP. No. 249, supra note 6, at 54 (emphasis added). In keeping with the letter
and spirit of the suspension agreement provisions, Commerce views them as the exception
rather than the rule. See Homer & Bello, U.S. Import Law and Policy Series: Suspension and
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This congressional sentiment was underscored in 1984. Under
the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, Congress tightened the termination provisions of the AD and CVD laws by directing the Commerce
Department to consider three public interest factors' 3 9 and to consult with potentially affected consumer, industry, and worker
groups 140 before suspending an AD or CVD investigation. But even
in 1980 when Zenith filed its action in the CIT, it should have been
evident to the reviewing courts that the "no law to apply" rule had
no applicability whatsoever to an action challenging the settlement
of an outstanding antidumping duty finding. Indeed, the CIT and
the CAFC should have understood that when Congress enacted the
AD and CVD provisions of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, it was
repealing pro tanto section 617.
First of all, compare Zenith with those cases in which the CAFC
has relied upon the "no law to apply" rule. For example, in Florsheim
Shoe Co. v. United States,'41 the Federal Circuit considered a challenge
to the President's decision to remove certain items from a list entitling them to preferential treatment under the Generalized System of
Preferences (GSP). 14 2 In rejecting the plaintiff's challenge, the
CAFC held that courts will narrowly review Presidential action taken
in conformance with delegated legislative authority, adding that
"[t]he President's findings of fact and the motivation for his action
are not subject to review.' 1 4 3 One distinguishing and critical feature
of the Florsheim Shoe case from the Zenith case is that the GSP does not
provide aggrieved persons any right to judicial review.
The identical rationale has been employed by the Federal Circuit under many of the other trade relief statutes in which the President has been given discretionary authority but where Congress has
made no express provision for judicial review of Presidential action
taken pursuant to that authority. Thus, in Maple Leaf Fish Co. v.
United States, 14 4 the Federal Circuit considered a challenge to the
scope of relief following an affirmative section 201 escape clause deSettlement Agreements in Unfair Trade Cases, 18 INT'L LAW. 683, 686-87 (1984). Through all of
1986, Commerce concluded only one AD and one CVD suspension agreement. See 51
Fed. Reg. 1005 (1986) (suspension of the countervailing duty investigation of certain red
raspberries from Canada based on "an agreement to offset or eliminate all benefits ...
found to constitute subsidies on exports of certain red raspberries to the United States");
Investigation of Canadian Red Raspberries Terminated on Basis of Suspension Agreement, 3 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) at 92 (Jan. 15, 1986); U.S.Japan Reach Five-Year Deal on Chips, Administra-.
tion Dropping Dumping, § 301 Cases, 3 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) at 995 (Aug. 6, 1986).
139 Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-573, § 604, 98 Stat. 2948, 3025-28
(codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671c(a)(2)(B), 1673c(a)(2)(B) (Supp. III 1985)).
140 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671c(a)(2)(C), 1673c(a)(2)(C) (Supp. III 1985).
141 744 F.2d 787 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
142 See Comment, Trade Preferences and LDCs: Less Executive Discretion and More Congressional Direction: Florsheim Shoe Co. v. United States, 58 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 903 (1984).
143 744 F.2d at 795.
144 762 F.2d 86 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
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termination. In upholding the scope of the President's relief determination, the CAFC stated that it would be improper for a court to
interfere absent executive branch action beyond the President's delegated authority, quoting Florsheim Shoe's admonition that "the President's findings of fact and the motivations for his action are not
subject to review."' 14 5 As was true under the GSP, section 201 does
not provide adversely affected parties with a right to judicial review.
Similarly, in Duracell Inc. v. U.S. International Trade Commission,' 4 6 the
Federal Circuit considered whether Presidential disapprovals under
section 337 were subject to judicial review. The court concluded
that it lacked jurisdiction to review a decision of the President disapproving an ITC unfair trade practice determination under section
3 3 7 (g)(2); that his decision was in effect
immune from judicial inquiry. 14 7 There again, however, Congress had not expressly provided for judicial review of executive branch action taken pursuant to
section 3 3 7 (g)(2).
48
Finally, in American Ass'n of Exporters & Importers v. United States, 1
a challenge was made to Presidential action taken pursuant to section
204 of the Agricultural Act of 1956 regulating textile imports to the
United States. The Federal Circuit held that no restrictions could be
placed on the President's actions so long as they were relevant to the
enforcement of an existing textile agreement.' 49 Section 204 does
not provide for judicial review of Presidential action taken under that
law.
The AD and CVD judicial review provisions of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, coupled with the sweeping reforms introduced by
the Customs Courts Act of 1980,150 stand in sharp contrast to the
foregoing trade relief laws and their absence ofjudicial review provisions. In enacting the Customs Courts Act of 1980, Congress sought
to clarify and enlarge the jurisdiction of the CIT's predecessor, the
Customs Court, in order to enable that court "to render extremely
expeditious decisions in matters which are important both to our
country and to our trading partners."' 15 1 Perhaps the most important of all the reforms introduced by the Customs Courts Act of 1980
was the enactment of 28 U.S.C. section 1581(C). 15 2 That section
145 Id. at 89.
146 778 F.2d 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1985). The Duracell case is only one of two reported
decisions to consider the issue of judicial review of Presidential disapprovals under 19
U.S.C. § 1337(g)(2), the other case being Young Eng'rs, Inc. v. International Trade
Comm'n, 721 F.2d 1305 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
147 Duracell, 778 F.2d at 1580-82.
148 751 F.2d 1239 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
149 Id. at 1247.
150 Pub. L. No. 96-417, 94 Stat. 1727 (1980) (codified in scattered sections of Title 28,
U.S.C.).
151 S. REP. No. 466, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-4 (1979).
152 That section provides that "[tihe Court of International Trade shall have exclusive
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vests exclusive jurisdiction in the CIT to review AD and CVD administrative determinations made by the International Trade Commission (ITC) and the International Trade Administration of the
Department of Commerce (ITA). In tandem with section 516A of
the Tariff Act of 1930, which was added by the Trade Agreements
Act of 1979,153 it empowers the CIT to review a host of determinations made by the ITC and the ITA in the course of an AD and CVD
investigation. The AD and CVD determinations judicially reviewable
are:
(1) a determination by the ITA not to initiate an
4
investigation;'

5

(2) an administrative review determination by the ITC or the
ITA under section 751, 19 U.S.C. section 1675(b); t 55
(3) a preliminary determination of no injury by the ITC; 15 6
(4) a final determination, either affirmative
or negative, by the
157
ITC or the ITA under the AD or CVD law;
(5) a determination by the ITA to suspend an AD or CVD
8

investigation;15

(6) an injurious effect determination by the ITC under 19
U.S.C. sections 1671c(h) or 1673c(h); 159 and
(7) a determination by the ITA whether a particular type of
merchandise is within the class or kind of merchandise described in
160
an AD or CVD order.
In section 1581(c) cases, CIT review is upon the administrative
record, 16 1 with the standard of review generally being whether the
agency's decision is supported by substantial evidence on the record
62
considered as a whole, or is otherwise not in accordance with law. 1
One of Congress' primary purposes in enacting the section 751
administrative review procedures was to give domestic interested
parties greater procedural safeguards, 16 and its main motive for enjurisdiction of any civil action commenced under section 516A of the Tariff Act of 1930
[19 U.S.C. § 1516a]."
153 19 U.S.C. § 1516a, as amended by the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, Pub. L. No.
98-573, § 623, 98 Stat. 2948, 3040. The 1984 amendments to § 516A eliminated most
interlocutory appeals to the CIT.
154 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(a)(l)(A) (Supp. III 1985).
155 Id. § 1516a(a)(i)(B).
156 Id. § 1516a(a)(i)(C).
157 Id. § 1516a(a)(2)(B)(i), (ii) & (iii).
158 Id. § 1516a(a)(2)(B)(v).
159 Id.

160 Id. § 1516a(a)(2)(B)(vi).
161 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(l)(B) (1982); 28 U.S.C. 2640(b) (1982).
162 Id. With certain preliminary determinations, such as a decision by the ITA not to
initiate an investigation, the standard of review is whether the agency's decision was arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law. 19
U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(l)(A) (1982).
163 S. REP. No. 249, supra note 6, at 81.
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acting the judicial review provisions of section 516A was to increase
the opportunities for judicial review of such determinations, 1 64 including the determination not to proceed with a section 751 review. The
CAFC put on judicial blinders when it concluded that because a "settlement" is not a "determination," sections 751 and 516A have no
applicability.' 6 5 Likewise, the CIT's conclusion that section 751 in
no way modifies section 617's authority to settle antidumping duty
claims 16 6 ignored the congressional intent behind the enactment of
the Trade Agreements Act of 1979. Both conclusions allowed the
Commerce Department to circumvent the strictures of the Trade
Agreements Act of 1979 on grounds that amounted to little more
167
than administrative convenience.
If Congress had intended such a result then why would it have
made it the rare case that AD cases be suspended? Even under an AD
suspension agreement, the exporters of the merchandise under investigation must either cease exports of the merchandise to the
United States, 168 or revise their prices to eliminate completely the
margin of dumping.' 69 Moreover, the requirement that the affected
domestic industries be consulted entails "[c]omplete disclosure and
discussion,"' 170 not merely pro forma communications. It is inconceivable that Congress could have intended the administrative end
around achieved in Zenith. While it is true that suspension agreements only take place in the context of an AD "investigation," which
the Zenith case was not, the spirit of the Trade Agreements Act of
1979 is that AD findings and orders are generally to be aggressively
enforced, not compromised or settled. Indeed, an AD investigation
may be settled under the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 only if the
petitioning American industry withdraws its petition. 17 1 Considering the remedial nature of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, it is
unfortunate that Congress' message concerning the lax enforcement
of the AD laws under the Treasury Department could be so easily
forgotten. There can be little doubt that Congress' expectation was
that the administrative enforcement of the AD laws would be tightened. The Zenith opinions defeated that expectation through their
cramped reading of congressional intent.
164 Id. at 244-45.
165 See Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 673 F.2d 1254, 1260
(C.C.P.A.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 943 (1982).
166 Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 509 F. Supp. 1282, 1286-87 (Ct. Int'l Trade
1981).
167 See 673 F.2d at 1264. "A tremendous backlog of cases was inherited by the Secretary which may well have interfered with current work of his Department ...."d
168 19 U.S.C. § 1673c(b)(1) (1982).
169 Id. § 1673c(b)(2) (1982).

170 S. REP. No. 249, supra note 6, at 71.
171 19 U.S.C. § 1673c(a) (Supp. II 1985). As noted by Homer & Bello, supra note

138, at 687, "The legislative history reveals Congress' expectation that investigations be
terminated only when in the public interest."
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The CIT was unable or unwilling to find any expression of congressional intent repealingpro tanto section 617.172 But all that is re73
quired is "some affirmative showing of an intention to repeal,"'
not proof of such repeal beyond a reasonable doubt. Indeed, there
may be a repeal by implication, although such repeals are not favored. 174 A statutory provision can be impliedly repealed by a subsequent enactment if the subsequent enactment covers the entire
subject of the prior provision. In United States v. Allen,' 7 5 the
Supreme Court noted:
While it is true that repeals by implication are not favored by the
courts, it is settled that, without express words of repeal, a previous
statute will be held modified by a subsequent one, if the latter was
plainly intended to cover the whole subject embraced by both, and
to prescribe
the only rules in respect to that subject that are to
76
govern. 1
The Trade Agreements Act of 1979 did not purport to supplant the

entire subject of settling claims arising under the customs laws, but
that Act did rewrite the rules for terminating and suspending AD
proceedings. It seems disingenuous to argue, as the CIT did, that
since sections 751 and 617 serve two different purposes, there was
no repugnancy between the two provisions.' 77 On the contrary, settling a case for a fraction of the dollar with no input from interested
third parties is certainly inconsistent with a statutory scheme that not
only obligates the administering agency to consult with interested
third parties before suspending an investigation, but also accords
such parties a right to an administrative review of all outstanding AD
findings and a further right to judicial review of that agency determination on the merits. That inconsistency is underscored by section
734(a) of the Trade Agreement Act of 1979,178 the only statutory
vehicle for settling AD cases under the Act, which requires withdrawal of the AD petition by the petitioning American industry in
79
order to terminate an AD investigation.1
Section 751 may not refer to or derogate from section 617 in
express terms, but at least the former implicitly modifies the latter.
If it were otherwise, then every AD order and finding subject to section 751 review could be forestalled via a section 617 settlement,
thereby repealing pro tanto not only section 751 but section 516A's
judicial review provisions as well. It is therefore impossible to read
sections 751, 516A, and 617, give effect to all three, and still pre172 See 509 F. Supp. at 1286-87.
173 Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 550 (1974).
174 Id.

175 163 U.S. 499 (1896).

176 Id. at 501 (quoting Tracy v. Tuffly, 134 U.S. 206, 223 (1890)).
177 See 509 F. Supp. at 1287-88.
178 19 U.S.C. § 1673c(a) (Supp. III 1985).
179

Id. See Homer & Bello, supra note 138, at 687.
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serve the sense and purpose of sections 751 and 516A. Under these
circumstances, the latter provisions in time must prevail, 18 0 particularly where, as here, they treat in far more detail the subject matter
covered generally in an earlier statute.' 8 '
IV.

Conclusion

The string of opinions flowing from the Zenith litigation highlights the great difficulty American industry has had in obtaining
meaningful trade relief because of executive branch discretionary
power. That Zenith and COMPACT came away empty handed was
not a foregone conclusion. On the contrary, although the courts
were faced with a congressional delegation of discretionary power to
the executive branch, a more sympathetic treatment of the Trade
Agreements Act of 1979 at the hands of the courts would have resulted at least in a hearing on the merits for Zenith and COMPACT.
Congress spoke in clear terms when it passed the Trade Agreements Act of 1979: In the future the administration of antidumping
duty law is not to be "business as usual." Congress wanted more
regularity and more predictability in the AD administrative process,
and less agency discretion. It sought to accomplish these goals by
enacting more stringent procedural guarantees for domestic interested parties, including giving them two opportunities to seek judicial review of that administrative process, the first in the CIT, the
second in the CAFC. 182 These goals were frustrated by the courts'
reluctance to check the executive branch and their willingness to put
a crabbed gloss on Congress' purpose in enacting the Trade Agreements Act of 1979.

180 See Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 268 (1981); 2A C. SANDS, SUTHERLAND ON STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 51.02 (1984).

181 See United States v. United Continental Tuna Corp., 425 U.S. 164, 168-69 (1976).
182 See 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(5).

